By Bruce Acker, former US Defence Attaché to Sweden
In the months leading up to the next election, defense debates in general and the Swedish Armed Force ability to defend Sweden’s territory will be increasingly in focus. The defense of Gotland inevitably appears in such a debate, though the substance of the debate available to the public equally inevitably lacks currency, depth and perspective.
Starting with currency, the notion that Gotland’s geography alone justifies its strategic significance, and that geography is permanent, overlooks the obvious shrines to previous concepts of critical terrain. Within 30 minutes’ drive of Stockholm, one can visit Vaxholm, Oxdjupet, and Baggenstäket, all historic chokepoints of once great significance, and defended accordingly in their time, but today defenseless.
Why? The range, accuracy, and effect of modern weapons coupled with alternatives to waterborne mobility rendered them irrelevant. What of Gotland, then? When one labels Gotland an unsinkable aircraft carrier, or states that commanding the island affords command of the entire Baltic, one overlooks the fact that Gotland can also be described as an aircraft carrier that has run aground, underneath Russian air defenses, and within range of missiles placed in Kaliningrad. Any forces placed there are vulnerable, difficult to resupply or redeploy in conflict, and possible to circumvent.
Regarding the depth of the debate, most of what is offered in the public arena describes only initial placement, a starting point. Conflict is dynamic, moves have counter moves, and so a thorough analysis of the effect of placing forces in one location or another requires simulations, analysis of attrition, numbers of assets and ammunition, and analysis of enemy tactics and strategy. So for example, tanks or airplanes placed on Gotland are initially vulnerable to missiles in Kaliningrad, but missiles can be depleted or overwhelmed, changing the calculus entirely.
An initial placement marks intent to defend, and an initial capability, but without the study of thorough wargaming (almost always non-public) the analysis is largely meaningless. Wargaming without consideration of strategic objectives, is not appropriate for resourcing decisions, its applicability limited to the tactical and operational art.
Perhaps the most significant shortfall in the public debate on the defense of Gotland is perspective. It stands to reason that if the island were indisputably strategic in its location, this fact would be central to planning outside of Sweden.
I had the privilege of representing to Sweden the US Defense department, including the US Forces assigned to Europe who would be the American forces assigned to defending NATO’s interests. In this capacity I accompanied Defense Ministers, politicians, and senior officers to top level meetings with NATO and American counterparts for four years, years in which the defense of the new NATO members on the Baltic’s eastern and southern shores were top priority questions.
Never once was I or any of the representatives I accompanied asked about Sweden’s commitment to defending Gotland. Never did I see a plan that included advocating the prepositioning of forces there. My conclusion is that the location is viewed as a tactical or possibly operational significant objective, entirely dependent on widely varying potential strategic objectives.
In a tactical or operational context, it is not hard to identify reasons why one might want forces on Gotland. But when one includes desired enemy strategic outcomes, alternative methods of achieving these outcomes, and risks to achieving these outcomes, the advantage of defending Gotland is far less clear.
As a complicating consequence of this effect, the Russians will also almost surely notice a shortfall in any logical defensive argument for militarizing Gotland and therefore look for Strategic offensive motives for such a Swedish policy, including threatening their vital economic lines of communications.
There are of course other considerations to the debate. Weapon system development has not gone so far yet that the forward nature of Gotland as an observation platform is irrelevant. Any sensors placed there would have a variety of advantages and need to be protected accordingly. As Sweden weighs its options for dimensioning its forces, those forces need to be placed somewhere, and access to good sea and airports like those in Visby are significant factors. Broader political commitment to the inhabitants’ physical security and economic wellbeing are certainly factors as well, though these things apply equally to all of Sweden, not just Gotland.
In the end, the Swedish public deserves a more authentic debate on the issues at stake than those presented so far by critics of the current policies, and that public would be well served by demanding thorough answers from those proposing significant re-investment in capabilities that were divested only recently with broad consensus and under previous leadership.
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This article was published last week on the site of Folk och Försvar, and reappears here with permission of both parties.
The absolutely so far best argument regarding the significance, or in some cases insignificance, of Gotland!
The relevance of Gotland as an observation point and also the relevance of Gotland as one of other suitable places to temporary use when convenient during peace and time of crisis is big. However, the argument often made about placing troops and a couple of tanks on the island to be used for ”deterrence” or to be used in wartime tend to focus only on the tactical level and not take in to consideration the ranges of modern weapon platforms, the logistical challenges of having troops on Gotland, or to look at the surrounding nations and their interests and capabilities.
Arguing that it is vital to deny someone to place longrange GBAD-systems or other longrange weapons on Gotland since that inevitable would deny our freedom of movement on and above the Baltic Sea tends to totally forget that modern – and in some cases not even modern – weapons already has the capability to achieve those ends today. Modern ballistic missiles and cruise missiles launched from own territory together with weaponplatforms on ships on international waters can already achieve those ends – without having to go to the trouble of occupying Gotland.
In th end, a government cannot say to 50 000 inhabitants on a piece of land in the middle of the Baltic that ”we will not try to defend you against aggression, because you have no strategic importance”. The fact that this aircraft carrier has run aground also makes unsinkable.
@Sven
The premise you base that argument on is valid for entire Sweden, given the organization of the Swedish Armed Forces today and in the foreseeable future that is something that cannot be achieved.
The question is however – is there something that makes Gotland more valuable to defend than other parts of Sweden?
And given the fact that we have very limited resources – is it really the right thing for Sweden to place them on an island?
Bruce,
The problem is that Russia do not act in the way you describe not in Zapad 2013 nor elsewhere .
It is by looking at what really took place – what kind of actions did the different units really conduct and how they were coordinated – that you get a clue of what kind of operations Russia will be able to mount in the future.
The decision to leave Gotland was taken when Russia was extremly weak .
That’s not case case any longer .
The combination of Rhetoric and action taken towards neigbours, military reform, the profile and scenarios exercised are not promising .
Best regards
Captain Jan-olov Holm Swedish Homeguard
@Bruce Acker:
It is interresting that american former officials are starting to get involved in Swedish defense politics right now at this point. (I here use the term ”politics” loosly.) Just now when there seems to be a light in the horizon for Sweden. I none the less welcome the initiative, but for my own reasons. But could it be that the US Government wants to starve the Swedish defense and rob us of our defense industry until a point where we are forced to join Nato, and that the conservative (?) ruling Swedish parties are in on it? I am not alone in suspecting this all conspiration theories set aside. The motive would be that the americanas want to be able to assist their Nato allies the Baltic states. The reason for the black out is that the United States under George H W Bush (senior) promised the Russians that they would not pursue a broadening of Nato bounderies. This is sensitive still today! It is a very trivial reason, but at an enormous cost for Sweden. Of course I too want too preserve the Baltic states status as sovereign nations, but couldn’t you had just asked us openly if we wanted to join Nato? As in so many other occasions Americas political actions will proove to have a counter effect. At least that is what I Believe.
Roger Klang, Lund Scaniae Sverige
It must be noted that irrespective of possible US uninterest in Gotland, Sweden has to be interested. This is not just a question of a stranded carrier it is also about the duty of Sweden to secure its territory for it’s own sake and also for the sake of others that have vital intersts related to it.
We have a duty by international law to secure this territory and if we do not care to do it other parties that also have vital intersts connected to it has the right to intervene and protect these interests.
One of our major neighbors indeed have vital interests connected to Gotland and the harbour Slite. It is indeed a source of concern that in a situation of international stress, short of war, this neighbour can be put in a situation where he has the rights by international law to secrur the interests we deny protection and ocupy part of Gotland.
Our possibillity to regain soverignty of this pice of territory will totally be at the will of the occupier. To put ourselves in that position, that might be avoided by a small peacetime defence effort, is not particularly smart. To be prime minister in such a scenario is nothing short of humiliating. We should not put our future leaders in such a position willfully.
Per Tengblad
åke eckerwall with thanks
To Bruce Acker for a balanced and relevant analysis of the situation